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In the summer of 1933, Charles H. Lyon, a Kansas City businessman, took “an extended tour by motor” of the Central Plains. The following March, having had time to reflect on his trip, he wrote to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to describe what he had seen, and to propose a remedy for the 
economic crisis gripping the nation. “Every good town had the same stores,” 
he explained. “The downtown of one city was a replica of the next one, and 
for every chain store that reared its head, three individually owned stores laid 
down and died.” Like thousands of other critics of the chains, Lyon believed 
that the growing homogeneity of small town life was brought about by the 
predatory nature and destructive impact of the chain store: “Chain stores pay 
very little toward the upkeep of a town,” he wrote. “They gradually kill it.” As 
well as reducing the aesthetic appeal of America’s Main Streets, chain stores 
imperilled the livelihoods of local merchants and contributed to the erosion 
of the national character. “Individual stores,” he informed the president, “are 
the backbone of a Nation.” The remedy was simple: Roosevelt should support 
moves to “tax the chain stores high enough so individual stores can compete 
against them.”1
By 1933, the first year of the New Deal, the idea that punitive taxation 
was required to protect local communities from the pernicious influence of 
the chains was far from being novel. In fact, chain store taxes were the most 
concrete achievement of the great wave of anti-chain store protest that swept 
through the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1923, the Missouri 
state legislature became the first to consider a chain store tax bill. In 1927, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, and Pennsylvania became the first 
states to pass such a law. But it was in the 1930s, in the depths of the Great 
Depression, that anti-chain legislative activity reached its zenith. Between 
1931 and 1937 twenty-six states passed anti-chain laws. Many municipali-
ties followed suit, devising an array of ingenious formulas to tax stores with 
multiple units. In 1938, Texas congressman Wright Patman failed in his 
attempt to impose a national chain store tax of the sort Lyon called for, but 
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by then Congress had already passed two new laws—the Robinson-Patman 
Act and the Miller-Tydings Act—designed to adjust the antitrust regime in 
favor of small retailers.2
While these various legislative initiatives have received some limited schol-
arly attention, the wider movement from which they sprang—the anti-chain 
store movement—remains one of the more neglected U.S. social movements 
of the first half of the twentieth century. This article examines that movement, 
and the reasons for its relative neglect, in the context of the recent surge of 
historical interest in the politics of consumption.3
It is true that since the 1990s, when campaigns against “big-box” stores 
such as Wal-Mart made anti-chain store politics once more a familiar feature 
of U.S. life, there has been a minor revival of scholarly interest in the anti-
chain store movement. This revival has been led by political philosophers, 
political sociologists, and legal scholars. In his influential book Democracy’s 
Discontent, Michael Sandel presented the “local grocers and druggists” who 
opposed the chains as “the last bearers of republican virtue,” holding them 
up as models for the renewal of civic republicanism. Less romantically, Paul 
Ingram and Hayagreeva Rao challenged the notion that efforts to thwart the 
chains were an unmitigated failure, arguing that pro- and anti-chain factions 
were interdependent, and that the anti-chain store movement succeeded in 
substantially changing the environment in which the chains operated. “An 
A&P that is unionized, and that sacrifices some of the benefits of market power 
to protect its agricultural suppliers,” they noted, “is a changed organization.” 
Most recently, Richard Schragger suggested that the localist and decentralist 
arguments employed by chain store critics represent a lost, progressive alter-
native to the liberal state that emerged during the Second World War. As a 
consequence of this new work, a movement conventionally portrayed as a 
futile response to inevitable processes of social and economic change—Daniel 
Boorstin called it a “rearguard action” aimed at preserving a “dying past”—is 
beginning to emerge in a new light.4 
A striking feature of this ongoing reassessment, however, is that historians 
have played little part in it. Given that in the past ten to fifteen years the poli-
tics of consumption has emerged as an important historical subdiscipline in 
its own right, and that there is an abundance of excellent historical work on 
the origins and trajectory of consumer activism in modern U.S. history, this 
is, in some respects, surprising. Nevertheless, when historians have attempted 
to explain the origins of contemporary consumer politics, or to provide a 
synthetic account of the relationship between the state and consumption in 
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the twentieth century, they have largely neglected the anti-chain store move-
ment. Instead they have focused, for example, on consumers’ role in forging 
the American Revolution, on the conscientious consumption practiced by 
some abolitionists from the 1820s to the 1860s, or, more typically, on the rise 
of a consumer interest during the Progressive and New Deal eras.5
This essay challenges such accounts by arguing that the anti-chain store 
movement was a constitutive element of the modern politics of consumption 
in the United States. The movement is best understood, I suggest, as a species 
of populist antimonopolism. It combined a political-economic perspective 
deeply indebted to the antimonopoly tradition, which was based on hostility 
toward large aggregations of economic and political power, with a distinctly 
populist character and rhetorical style. Valorizing producers (especially farm-
ers) and viewing the federal government and Wall Street with deep suspicion, 
populist antimonopolism represents an important and remarkably persistent 
strand of a U.S. politics of reform.6
In exploiting the antimonopoly tradition, the independent merchants who 
were at the forefront of anti-chain politics at the grassroots level made their 
case in a form typically associated with producer rather than consumer poli-
tics. An argument of this essay, however, is that to separate these categories, 
thus implying a sharp distinction between inherently interrelated aspects of 
political economy, is not always appropriate. In fact, this binary approach can 
be positively unhelpful. The politics of consumption—if it is to be a plausible 
and effective category of historical analysis—should at the very least, I sug-
gest here, be alert and open to the politics not only of production, but also of 
distribution and retail. “Production and consumption politics,” as Matthew 
Hilton and Martin Daunton put it, “are not alternatives.”7 
It is important to emphasize here that antimonopolism was a vibrant force 
in the 1920s and during the New Deal. This was true both of its populist 
variant, as expressed in the anti-chain politics of southern congressmen such 
as Huey Long and Wright Patman, who attacked big banks and corporations 
while claiming to speak for “the people,” and in its more moderate progres-
sive form, as articulated, for example, by Supreme Court justice Louis D. 
Brandeis, architect of Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, and the anti-chain 
store movement’s most prominent supporter in the judiciary. 
The New Deal weakened the antimonopoly tradition, but it did not kill it 
off altogether. Through the 1930s, as the New Deal took on an increasingly 
social democratic character, shaped in particular by the rise of mass indus-
trial unionism, antimonopoly was partially supplanted in the U.S. politics 
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of reform. But the hammer blow to antimonopoly dealt by the New Deal 
was not fatal. Rather, antimonopoly politics survived, albeit in a somewhat 
attenuated form, to shape the politics, and especially the consumer politics, 
of the postwar United States. Indeed, as we shall see, the consumer politics of 
the postwar era, led by figures such as Estes Kefauver and Ralph Nader, owed 
a significant debt to populist antimonopolism. While we should be careful 
not to neglect the differences between the pre- and post-New Deal politics 
of consumption, it is worth noting the continuities too, particularly as these 
are often overlooked. Further, while the twenty-first century politics of con-
sumption are in many respects radically different from those experienced by 
the independent merchants who battled chain stores in the 1920s and 1930s, 
it is no surprise either that in our present era of global economic flux—the 
age of globalization—many of the debates that animated the Depression-era 
anti-chain store movement have resurfaced.
Historians and the Anti-Chain Store Movement
Until the 1960s, those seeking to understand the anti-chain store move-
ment were forced to rely on polemical literature produced by the pro- and 
anti-chain factions. They could turn, for example to Montaville Flowers’s 
America Chained, a compilation of radio talks dramatizing the struggle between 
“economic force” and “human welfare,” or to Charles Daughters’s Wells of 
Discontent, which made inflammatory use of extracts from Wright Patman’s 
congressional hearings on the lobbying practices of the American Retail 
Federation. Daughters asserted that a political economy based on absentee 
ownership and concentration of control placed the United States firmly on 
the “broad highway to revolution.” Chain store boosters offered diametrically 
opposed arguments to those posited by Flowers and Daughters in works such 
as Godfrey Lebhar’s Chain Stores—Boon or Bane? Remarkably, Lebhar’s partisan 
1952 study, Chain Stores in America, remains to this day the fullest published 
narrative account of the anti-chain store movement.8 
The historical literature on the anti-chain store movement became im-
measurably richer, however, when two great historians, Richard Hofstadter 
and Ellis Hawley, set down their thoughts on the antimonopoly tradition 
from which the anti-chain store movement sprang. Neither historian devoted 
sustained attention to anti-chain politics, but Hofstadter and Hawley between 
them established the intellectual parameters for subsequent historical under-
standing of the movement. In a famous essay written in 1963, Hofstadter 
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described the antitrust movement as “one of the faded passions of American 
reform.” After 1940, he argued, antitrust, which had had a profound impact 
since 1890, ceased to be a matter of “compelling public interest,” even if, 
ironically, its actual impact on business increased. “Once the United States 
had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions,” he wrote; “in our 
time there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement.” 
In this way, Hofstadter, perhaps unwittingly, steered historians away from 
considering the continuities between pre- and postwar antimonopoly politics. 
Why study a topic that no longer fired the imaginations of either reformers 
or the public? Hawley took a different tack, but his subtle and brilliant study 
of “the problem of monopoly” had a similar effect. In his brief treatment of 
the anti-chain store movement, he emphasized the difficulty the anti-chain 
forces had in forming an effective lobby in a political environment increas-
ingly dominated by interest groups. Hawley noted that while the New Deal 
did not solve the problem of monopoly, “most Americans,” when faced with 
the “size-efficiency dilemma” would “eventually choose economic efficiency 
over littleness per se.”9 
Thereafter, the few historians who studied the anti-chain store movement 
in any depth operated safely within the framework established by Hofstadter 
and Hawley. In 1973, Carl Ryant, who, despite the movement’s significant 
pockets of strength in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest, regarded it as an 
essentially southern phenomenon, pointed to the gulf between its populist 
rhetoric and the “reality” of accelerating economic integration. Similarly, in 
1982, F. John Harper portrayed the protests as remnants of a fading social 
and economic order. The “agitation,” he said, employing a term that implied 
the movement’s backwardness and irrationality, belonged “to a past which is 
not only forgotten by, but is also incomprehensible to, the vast majority of 
American independent retailers today.”10 
In 2008, of course, organized anti-chain store activity is comprehensible, 
even to independent retailers. Since the 1980s, small retailers in numerous 
communities across the United States have combined at the local level with 
small-town preservationists and an assortment of community activists to 
form coalitions opposed to the rise of “big-box” retail. Furthermore, in the 
last decade or so organized labor has joined the fray. Indeed, the trade union 
drive to challenge the employment terms, conditions, and practices of giant 
enterprises such as Wal-Mart has become the most powerful factor in twenty-
first-century anti-chain politics. The predominance of organized labor is 
perhaps the most important respect in which present-day anti-chain activity 
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differs from its Depression-era counterpart. What I would emphasize here, 
however, is the remarkably broad ideological range of contemporary critiques 
of the chain store. This is exemplified on the shelves of U.S. bookstores, where 
guidebooks advising retailers and others on how to keep “big-box” stores out 
of their communities mingle with popular polemics seeking to exploit the 
widespread public unease over the power of corporate retail in general, and 
of Wal-Mart in particular. Today therefore, as in 1930, when readers of The 
Nation were told that “the chain store menace” was “the question most talked 
of below the Ohio,” the rise of retail giantism is, for some at least, an issue of 
national—even international—importance. The new anti-chain store politics 
of the early twenty-first century presents us with an ideal opportunity both to 
reconsider the import of its Depression-era antecedent, and to compare two 
distinct but related episodes of anti-chain activism.11 
“Nothing But Serfdom”
From top to bottom, the anti-chain store movement was suffused by the 
language, imagery, and ideology of populism. When, for example, on January 
24, 1931, Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota spoke in the United States Senate 
to propose that the 1914 Clayton Act be amended to empower the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) “to receive complaints and hear testimony” in 
relation to a host of unfair trade practices in which chains were alleged to 
be engaged, he did so in classically populist terms. Speaking for “the corner 
grocery man, the little druggist, the struggling farmer, the owner of the small 
factory, the operator of an oil well, or the proprietor of a community pack-
ing plant,” Nye, a progressive Republican best known for his opposition to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s foreign policy, warned that independent operators 
were being “crushed” by a “juggernaut of greed.” Quoting from the Book of 
Revelation, he described monopoly as a pestilential force, “a cancer, spreading 
and devouring, as it goes, the whole tissue of the Nation’s economic body.” 
For the sake of both “the consumer” and “the producer” he urged that the 
government act to preserve “thousands of home-owned stores, home-owned 
factories, home-owned banks, and independent industry.” If it did not, he 
warned, “the Frankenstein it has called into being will ultimately destroy 
government itself.”12
Nye’s highly charged populist language, freely mixing classical and biblical 
allusions with references to Gothic horror, matched that of his North Dakota 
constituents, who throughout 1930 and 1931 deluged him with letters urg-
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ing that action be taken to stop the chains. In February 1930, E. O. Moe, a 
banker from Galesburg, North Dakota, wrote Nye about “one of the most 
diabolical menaces that ever confronted the American people,” the “chain 
system.” “Chain stores, chain banks, chain this and chain that,” he wrote, had 
“infested our nation like a plague.” Echoing Nye’s attacks on privilege and 
monopoly, Moe warned that if “the people” did not “wake up to this menace . . . 
all individual enterprise and effort” would be “strangled.” Summoning rhetori-
cal inspiration from Frank Norris’s 1901 antimonopoly classic, The Octopus, 
he claimed that “these giant octopuses from the financial centers of the East” 
were “extending their slimy tentacles into most every state in the union.” For 
Moe, the rise of the chains represented “a reversion back to Feudalism.” The 
“chain system” was based on “eliminating the individual as a unit in industry,” 
he stated. “The individual” would as a consequence be reduced to being no 
more than “a cog in a big machine.”13
E. O. Moe’s conviction that the chains represented a threat to cherished 
values of self-sufficiency and independence, as well as to the solvency of in-
dividual economic units, was widely shared. Predictably, many, though by no 
means all, of the anti-chain store letters Nye received were from independent 
merchants. H. F. Rodenberg, co-owner of a department store in New Rockford, 
complained that due to the chains it was now “very hard for a young man to 
go in[to] business for himself.” For F. R. Barnes of Marmarth, the problem 
was brought about by “big money getting control of our national adminis-
tration.” Another of Nye’s correspondents, Stephen C. Barnes, who owned 
a variety store in Williston, explained that “[the] feeling here in Williston 
among the independent merchants is that the spread of the chains and their 
unscrupulous methods . . . threatens the life and future of thousands in [sic] 
smaller merchants who have worked a life time to build up their individual 
business.” “All the future holds [for them],” Barnes added, “is the chance of 
[becoming] an underpaid clerk, working in cog No 689 in store 1237, without 
hope of advancement, gain, possible partnership or ownership of a store of 
their own;—nothing but serfdom.”14
Like some modern-day critics of globalization, Nye and his correspondents 
saw themselves as pitted somewhat apocalyptically against powerful, parasitic, 
and entrenched elites who were stripping them of their autonomy and threaten-
ing their values as well as their livelihoods. It has been argued, quite plausibly, 
that in many communities, independent merchants were themselves virtual 
monopolists. Often they were the sole reliable source of credit in cash-starved 
local and regional economies. But these retailers did not see themselves that 
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way. Instead, they employed, to borrow from Michael Kazin, “a language 
whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage not bounded 
narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic, 
and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” To this extent they stood 
squarely within the populist antimonopoly tradition.15
The populist character of the anti-chain store movement may partly explain 
historians’ reluctance to subject it to serious scrutiny. Ellis Hawley described 
the movement as a crusade led by “popular demagogues” and “colorful rogues.” 
He was referring specifically to Huey Long and W. K. Henderson, flamboy-
ant Louisianans whose attacks on the chains were presented in an extravagant 
rhetorical style. “Where is the corner groceryman?” Long once asked. “The 
Kingfish” believed that the concentration of economic power threatened the 
very existence of the independent middle class. Henderson, a Shreveport 
businessman, used his radio station, KWKH, the Hello World Broadcasting 
Corporation, vehemently to assail the chains. He rallied listeners across the 
South and Midwest to support local merchants and to boycott the chains. He 
used what some then deemed coarse language (“hell” and “damn”) to generate 
his own grassroots consumer movement. But Long and Henderson were not 
representative of either the movement as a whole or of its leadership. Other 
leading anti-chain figures, such as Joseph T. Robinson, Wright Patman, and 
Hugo Black—three of the more prominent anti-chain congressmen—are 
less easily caricatured. As Hawley himself well understood, the anti-chain 
store movement amounted to much more than an emotional response to 
change whipped up by silver-tongued orators. It was a movement of some 
intellectual depth that posited, however crudely, an alternative conception of 
political economy.16
“Such Is the Frankenstein Monster”
The leading supporter of the anti-chain store movement in the judiciary, Su-
preme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, could never be described as colorful, 
roguish, or demagogic. His opposition to the chains, particularly as it was 
articulated in his dissent in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, the Florida anti-chain 
store case that came before the Supreme Court in early 1933, suggests both 
the vitality of antimonopoly thought during the Great Depression, and the 
fact that the anti-chain store movement had an impressive intellectual as well 
as emotional hinterland.
That Brandeis was sympathetic to the anti-chain store movement is not in 
doubt. His dissent in Liggett was almost gleeful. On reading a draft of Brandeis’s 
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opinion, which argued that the states were perfectly entitled to tax the chains, 
and that the privilege of incorporation was just that—a privilege—Harlan 
Stone, who, with Benjamin Cardozo, had so often joined Brandeis in making 
up the liberal minority on the court, told Brandeis that in this instance he 
was “too much an advocate of this kind of legislation.” Coming from Stone, 
that was quite a damning charge.17
Whereas Stone deemed Brandeis’s dissent overenthusiastic, Owen D. 
Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion striking down the law, struggled 
to comprehend its relevance. “I appreciate your sending me the draft of your 
opinion in #301,” he wrote Brandeis. “You are quite right that I agree with 
much—indeed most—of what you say.” “The only difficulty I find,” he con-
tinued, “is in agreeing that these matters are involved in this particular case.” 
The “matters” Roberts referred to were those related to Brandeis’s lengthy 
disquisition on the history of the law of incorporation, which occupied the 
greater part of his opinion.18
The majority opinion in Liggett stated that the Florida chain store tax was 
unconstitutional because it involved making an arbitrary distinction between 
chains in one county and those in another. In 1931, the court had already 
ruled by the narrowest of margins in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson 
that it was legitimate to tax chain and non-chain stores differently. Brandeis, 
Cardozo, and Stone were joined in that ruling by Roberts and by the chief 
justice, Charles Evans Hughes. Jackson led to a flurry of anti-chain legislative 
activity. In 1933 alone, 225 anti-chain bills were introduced in forty-two 
states. For the most part, these bills, following the form affirmed in Jackson, 
were based on a system of graduated license fees. The Florida law, however, 
was slightly different in that it made a geographical distinction, and it was on 
this that the majority seized:19
The addition of a store to an existing chain is a privilege, and an increase of the tax on all 
the stores for the privilege of expanding the chain cannot be condemned as arbitrary; but 
an increase in the levy, not only on a new store, but on all the old stores, consequent upon 
the mere physical fact that the new one lies a few feet over a county line, finds no founda-
tion in reason or in any fact of business experience.20
Of the three justices who dissented, two—Cardozo and Stone—contented 
themselves with contesting the majority’s argument that the geographical 
distinction made in the Florida law was arbitrary. In a largely agricultural 
state with a widely dispersed population such as Florida, Cardozo argued, it 
was a reasonable exercise of discretion for the legislature to use county lines to 
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distinguish between the local and nonlocal. If a chain determined to take on 
the “hazard of new adventures” by opening a branch in another county then 
it had, Cardozo averred, “put its local character away, and found alignment 
in another class.”21
In his separate dissent, Brandeis went much further. Reflecting his belief 
that “social and economic life” should inform judicial decision making, he 
took pains to emphasize the destructive motive of the Florida law, and the 
fact that it arose out of social and moral concerns. Brandeis and his clerks 
began working on the Liggett dissent on January 23, 1933, in the midst of the 
“interregnum of despair,” the period between Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election 
in November and his taking office in the following March. By January 28 
they had arrived at a fifth draft, which included a statement in the opening 
paragraph that “the raising of revenue is obviously not the sole purpose of 
the legislation.” Brandeis knew, however, that what was obvious to him was 
not obvious to the majority. The court would rule that to say the Florida 
law was aimed at “giant corporations” was “to attribute . . . a covert, hidden, 
and indirect purpose to those who passed the statute.” The fact that all the 
plaintiffs were large corporations did not impress Roberts, who suggested 
that to assume this motive would be “to construe the act by pure specula-
tion.” Anticipating this line of reasoning, Brandeis, by the time he arrived at 
a final draft, had strengthened his opening, changing “sole” to “main.” Now 
the raising of revenue was a secondary motive. The “main purpose” was “to 
protect the individual, independently-owned retail stores from the competi-
tion of chain stores.”22
Brandeis dismissed with almost peremptory brevity the grounds on which 
the Florida anti-chain store law was struck down:
There is nothing in the record to show affirmatively that the provision may not be a reason-
able one in view of conditions prevailing in Florida. Since the presumption of constitution-
ality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the 
statute, its validity should, in my opinion, be sustained.23
Then, feigning disinterest in the question of whether anti-chain taxation was 
desirable (“Whether the citizens of Florida are wise in seeking to discourage the 
operation of chain stores is, obviously, a matter with which the Court has no 
concern”), he launched into an immensely detailed, voluminously researched, 
and typically didactic discussion of the history of incorporation. “Whether 
the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld,” he insisted, “is always a 
matter of state policy.” In a less than veiled attack on his conservative peers, 
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he chastised those “men of this generation” who believed that “the privilege 
of doing business in corporate form were inherent in the citizen,” noting that 
fear of concentrated power and the perception that “large aggregations of 
capital” represented an “insidious menace” to individual liberty and equality 
of opportunity were deeply embedded in the nation’s history.24
The footnotes to Brandeis’s opinion, to say nothing of the vast reading 
lists with which he was supplied by Library of Congress librarians, show that 
the justice had read widely on the international history of corporation law, 
the economics of the chain store, and the cooperative movement. He leaned 
especially heavily, however, on Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’s recently 
published The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which claimed that 
two hundred corporations controlled almost a quarter of the nation’s wealth, 
and that the separation of ownership from control meant that corporations 
were in some instances able to dominate the state. As in New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, the 1932 case in which Brandeis had suggested that the nation’s 
economic collapse had been brought about by the “failure to distribute widely 
the profits of industry,” in Liggett he linked the “negation of industrial democ-
racy,” and the inequalities of wealth it promoted, to the deepening economic 
malaise, claiming that “the resulting disparity in incomes is a major cause of 
the existing depression.” Seeking an image to capture the magnitude of the 
threat, he expressed himself in terms strikingly similar to those employed by 
the North Dakota merchants who had written so despairingly to Senator 
Nye: “Such is the Frankenstein monster which states have created by their 
corporation laws.”25
Here, Brandeis was striving to combine his conviction that the law 
should respond to life and history while making full use of the latest social 
scientific research, with his aversion to bigness. In attempting to move, to 
use Philippa Strum’s phrase, “beyond progressivism,” Brandeis of Boston, 
with his mugwumpish faith in expertise and scientific approach to the law, 
adopted an attention-grabbing populist rhetorical style. Brandeis, of course, 
was not a populist in any conventional sense. Even his admirers thought 
him not a man of the people but rather, as his friend Harold Laski observed, 
a sort of “prophet.” What is significant here, however, is that by employing 
the Frankenstein metaphor, “the people’s attorney” used an image that shows 
continuity between the language and beliefs of grassroots protesters and the 
mode of Brandeisian progressivism that influenced the early New Deal. In the 
darkest days of the Depression, antimonopoly thought, with its accompanying 
vision of a nation based on the initiative of “small men” operating within an 
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economy of small units, was a still vital force on the Supreme Court as well 
in the small towns across the nation from which the anti-chain movement 
drew much of its strength.26
It may be an exaggeration to propose, as has Richard Schragger, that 
“Brandeisian localism” represented “a lost alternative to the liberalism of the 
late New Deal”; but Brandeis’s defence of the anti-chain cause reminds us 
of the richness and variety of the reformist agendas that were circulating in 
the 1930s. In the early 1930s especially, the future of political economy (and 
therefore of the politics of consumption) in the United States was up for grabs. 
The precise fate of these various agendas, as well as the strains of political 
thought to which they were tied—antimonopolism, centralized planning, 
and corporatism, among others—was by no means foreordained.27
In this context it is important to emphasize that the politics of consumption 
that emerged from the New Deal was markedly different from the politics of 
consumption that made it. As Alan Brinkley has explained, the liberalism that 
evolved in the late 1930s and that was consolidated during the Second World 
War “wrapped itself in the mantle of the New Deal, but bore only a partial 
resemblance to the ideas that had shaped the original New Deal.” Historians 
of the New Deal era have acknowledged Brandeis’s role—and that of his disci-
ples—in shaping the Roosevelt administration’s approach to political economy 
in the 1930s; historians of the politics of consumption, however, have yet to 
be persuaded that antimonopolism, whether in its populist or Brandeisian 
form, is pertinent to them, except in representing what the modern politics 
of consumption replaced. As Richard Schragger has observed, it is typically 
assumed that the story of the twentieth century politics of consumption is 
that of the relationship between the emerging consumer and the liberal state, 
an approach that is necessarily dismissive of alternative perspectives, whether 
reformist or reactionary.28
The End of Anti-chain store Politics?
By the mid-1930s, the anti-chain store movement had run its course as a 
popular movement. Grassroots activity crested in the early 1930s, in the years 
when the Depression was at its deepest and before the chains had adapted 
their message to counter the claims of their opponents. But the movement’s 
advocates in Congress persisted in pressing for some legislative means of 
protecting merchants. Leading the legislative charge was Wright Patman of 
Texarkana, whose congressional district was one of the poorest in the nation. 
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Patman’s political outlook—like that of other southern populists sympathetic 
to the anti-chain campaign—was based on the notion that the economy 
should be organized so as to preserve the autonomy of local producers and 
the communities they served. He espoused many of the causes that would 
later be associated with consumer advocacy—most notably banking reform 
and more aggressive regulation of corporations—but his approach was chiefly 
producer, rather than consumer, oriented. 
Like the nineteenth century populists, Patman resented what he regarded 
as the monopolistic power of northern banks and corporations and perceived 
the South and West as unjustly subjugated colonies. “The North is the Ameri-
can money mart that is fed by the monetary streams of trade and commerce 
originating in the South and West,” he said. His solutions to this problem 
were of similar vintage: he advocated increasing the amount of money in 
circulation and erecting barriers to prevent big corporations from distorting 
local competition.29
Patman, whose congressional career bridged the pre- and post-New Deal 
eras, embodied the problematic position of the antimonopoly tradition as 
it related to the wider politics of reform in the United States. Like other 
southern populists, he idealized community-based economic activity but at 
the same time assumed that the preservation of the local order—Jim Crow 
notwithstanding—was benign, even when that order perpetuated racial and 
gender hierarchies that worked systematically to disadvantage racial minori-
ties and women. He opposed the Ku Klux Klan but he also opposed federal 
anti-lynching legislation and the employment during the Second World War 
of African Americans in war-related industries. After the Second World War, 
he criticized Eisenhower’s use of federal troops at Little Rock in 1957 and 
voted against the civil rights bills of the 1950s and 1960s. In the course of his 
long career he showed no appreciation of the gendered nature of his vision of 
a nation of small towns led by independent businessmen.30
Other antimonopolists in Congress were more conservative still. Senate 
Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson, who cosponsored the Robinson-Patman 
Act, viewed his efforts to shield independent merchants from low-cost com-
petition as a natural extension of Wilsonian progressivism; but the Arkansas 
senator could not bring himself to support federal minimum wage legislation, 
and was a fierce opponent of the Southern Tenant Farmers’ Union’s attempts to 
unionize southern agriculture. Some later antimonopolists, such as Tennessee 
senator Estes Kefauver, were a good deal more liberal on racial issues; but it is 
true nonetheless that the localist philosophy at the core of the antimonopoly 
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tradition entrenched sometimes pernicious local hierarchies and power rela-
tions. Since the New Deal, and the consolidation of the idea that liberalism 
requires an active federal government in order to address economic, racial, 
and other inequalities, localists have struggled to find a home for themselves 
within the mainstream politics of reform.31
Antimonopolists in Congress did not easily give up their assault on the 
chains. In February 1938, Wright Patman submitted a bill for a national chain 
store tax. It proposed a graduated scale by which chains would be taxed from 
$50 to $1,000 per store depending upon their number and location. Because 
this figure would then be multiplied by the number of states in which a chain 
had stores, there was a chance that the tax might in some cases exceed annual 
profits. If this scale had been applied in 1938, for example, the biggest chain 
store company, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P), would 
have been taxed $524 million on its $882 million in sales. Tellingly, whereas 
its supporters called this measure the “community preservation bill,” its op-
ponents in the business press and among chain store organizations referred 
to it as the “death-sentence bill.”32
Leading figures in the anti-chain drive worked together as part of an in-
formal network. Louis D. Brandeis and Wright Patman met, for instance, for 
an hour in March 1937 to discuss how to combat monopoly. In 1940 they 
cooperated again on the hearings for Patman’s chain store tax. Despite this 
joint effort, Patman’s plans for a federal chain store tax never materialized. By 
1940 the chains had had time to respond to the anti-chain onslaught. They 
had persuaded farmers that the chains’ distribution networks served their inter-
ests, and they had convinced organized labor that they were good employers. 
Some consumer groups, too, viewed the chains as welcome components of a 
progressive, low-price economy, while real estate agents saw in the chains the 
chance to profit from local development. In the absence of effective interest 
group representation, and lacking the broad base of popular support that 
had characterised the anti-chain store movement of the late 1920s and early 
1930s, the federal chain store tax died in committee. The death of the “death 
sentence” bill effectively brought the Depression-era phase of American anti-
chain politics to a close.33
From Producer to Consumer Advocacy
Having surveyed the character and historical trajectory of the anti-chain store 
movement, we can now consider the relationship between the antimonopolism 
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that informed the anti-chain store politics of the 1920s and 1930s, and the 
postwar politics of consumption. What is the relationship between what we 
might call the “producer advocacy” of Wright Patman and his populist allies 
and the “consumer advocacy” that became part of the mainstream of American 
politics in the 1960s and 1970s?
In the 1920s, when the anti-chain store movement began, the most visible 
form of consumer activism was that pursued by middle-class women reformers 
in such organizations as the National Consumers’ League. With some justifica-
tion, many historians regard such women as the founders of modern consumer 
politics. But this essay argues that antimonopoly politics—championed for 
the most part by male populists rather than female progressives—represents 
both a second component of the ideological origins of postwar consumer 
politics, and a persistent strain within those politics through the latter half of 
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. 
Consider, for instance, that in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States’ most 
active and visible champion of consumer issues in Congress, Estes Kefauver, 
was also its most prominent antimonopolist. Kefauver devoted the greater part 
of his career to a series of populist attacks on monopolistic practices, whether in 
the form of railroad mergers, the basing point system, or administered prices. 
Kefauver was the lead figure among a cluster of congressmen—Paul Douglas, 
Philip Hart, William Proxmire, Edmund Muskie, Warren Magnussen—who, 
from the 1940s to the 1970s, drew to varying degrees on the antimonopoly 
tradition to champion the cause of the consumer. It was Douglas, Kefauver, 
and Hart, for example, who fought hardest in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
in an effort to persuade the federal government to establish a new Depart-
ment of Consumers so that—as Kefauver put it—“the voice of the consumer” 
would be “heard in the land.”34
Antimonopolism’s contribution to postwar consumer politics continued 
through the 1960s and 1970s. An illustration of this link is the political bond 
formed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, between Wright Patman—the poli-
tician most closely associated with the older anti-chain store movement—and 
Ralph Nader, indisputably the leading consumer advocate of the postwar era. 
Patman and Nader were both crusaders, politicians driven by a powerful sense 
of injustice who directed their political attention toward what they perceived 
to be undemocratic concentrations of economic power. Indeed, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, these “strange bedfellows,” as the Washington Post 
called them, campaigned together, attacking one-bank holding companies for 
evading the terms of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and criticizing 
Delaware’s incorporation laws.35
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Nader believed that Patman was a prophetic figure who had anticipated and 
fought the consumer movement’s battles even before they were understood 
in those terms. “Whether the issue deals with consumer credit, credit unions, 
bank mergers, the secret power of the Federal Reserve, the bank holding com-
pany movement or adequate credit for housing,” he wrote in January 1975, 
“Patman remains the youngest populist of them all.”36 
On Patman’s death the following year, Nader made explicit the links be-
tween a populist antimonopolism typically associated with the pre-New Deal 
era and postwar consumer politics. “For half a century,” he wrote, “Wright 
Patman was a great public educator on the power of big money and bank-
ing. He was an unyielding and genial populist whose ideals and ardor never 
eroded. The great Texas legislator was right too soon, too often, about the 
giant banks and the Federal Reserve. But he lived to witness the news of the 
day—further confirming his findings of long ago.” In another tribute, Texan 
congressman Jim Wright elaborated upon the same theme: “Long before to-
day’s self-proclaimed consumer advocates were born, Wright Patman was in 
Congress waging a lonely, but effective fight against those who would exploit 
their fellow citizens of modest means.”37
The fact that Nader saw himself—and the broader movement of which 
he was a part—as standing in Patman’s shadow poses fascinating questions 
for historians interested in the origins and trajectory of twentieth century 
consumer politics. It hints at the flawed nature of the producer-consumer 
dichotomy customarily adopted by historians, and it suggests that populist 
antimonopolism had a hitherto unrecognized formative impact on modern 
consumer activism.
The idea that there was, in the twentieth century, a shift from a producer- 
to a consumer-oriented economy, society, and culture provides a powerful 
explanatory structure for understanding the changing contours of recent 
U.S. history. But if this framework is adopted uncritically, with insufficient 
attention to the ways in which the worlds of consumers are connected to the 
worlds of producers, distributors, and retailers, it is likely to prove inadequate. 
If historians assume, for instance, that a consumer’s world replaced a producer’s 
world entirely, then important continuities and connections between those 
worlds, as well as significant countercurrents of resistance to change, might 
be unduly obscured. There is much scope for more historical work both on 
the connections between pre-New Deal producerism and post-New Deal 
consumerism, and on the persistence of producerism into the postwar era.
A further problem with the notion of a transition from producerism to 
consumerism within the United States is that the politics of consumption does 
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not observe national borders; it is international and transnational, as well as 
local, regional, and national. While there is comparative work on the politics 
of consumption, it focuses overwhelmingly on the United States and Europe. 
There is therefore tremendous potential for transnational study. It is quite 
obvious today that, for example, the United States’ politics of consumption are 
also China’s politics of production. The exploitative quasi-colonial relationship 
between the U.S. South and West and the concentration of financial and gov-
ernmental power in the Northeast that informed Wright Patman’s perception 
of politics in the 1920s and 1930s may now, arguably, be detected on a global 
scale as U.S. consumers demand goods and raw materials from the emerging 
economies of the global South. Historians might also undertake comparative 
studies of early and mid-twentieth century small producer populisms. How, 
for instance, does Wright Patman’s politics compare to that of Pierre Poujade 
and his followers in postwar France?
A second challenge presented by the Patman-Nader connection is that, as 
Lawrence Glickman has noted, the history of consumer activism in the United 
States has been dominated by work that assumes that modern consumer 
politics developed through discontinuous eruptions of reform in (with some 
minor variations) the 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s. Lizabeth Cohen, for example, 
has proposed that the consumer movement developed in three “waves,” each 
of which reconfigured the relationship between the consumer and the state. 
These “waves” broadly coincide with the bouts of liberal reform conventionally 
associated with the Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society eras. First, at 
the dawn of the twentieth century, progressive reformers placed the consumer 
at the forefront of their conception of citizenship while at the grass roots 
housewives and laborers campaigned for a higher standard of living. Then, 
in the 1930s, New Deal policymakers and economists combined with citizen 
activists—women and African Americans prominent among them—to form 
a “second wave,” placing the “citizen consumer” center stage. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, as the raised expectations of the immediate postwar era yielded 
to the constraints imposed by the economic crisis of the 1970s, a “third wave 
consumer movement,” better attuned to the more segmented and socially 
differentiated environment of the postwar world, emerged.38
Such taxonomies provide a plausible framework for understanding the 
broad historical contours of the U.S. politics of consumption. Cohen’s work is 
particularly important because it shows how activity at the grass roots—with 
women and African Americans once more at the vanguard—combined with 
state-level policymaking to shape the “consumers’ republic.” She also provides 
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a necessary corrective to the view that the search for the origins of consumer 
culture must begin with urban elites, professionalization, and expertise. But 
Cohen’s view of the origins and trajectory of twentieth-century consumer 
politics is incomplete. Sometimes, as with the anti-chain store movement in 
the 1920s and 1930s, grassroots activists promoted a cause that ultimately was 
not supported by most liberal policymakers, and which in fact came to stand 
in opposition to the liberal state as it had developed by the mid-twentieth 
century, but which nevertheless was connected both at the level of ideas and 
political leadership to the postwar consumer movement.39 
Anti-Chain Store Movements: Old and New
The ideological origins of contemporary consumer politics, then, were more 
heterogeneous than has previously been recognized; they can be traced back 
not only to late nineteenth- and early twentieth century progressives and their 
New Deal heirs, but also to political and intellectual forces only partially re-
lated to the rise and fall of the New Deal order. The populist antimonopolism 
that informed the anti-chain store movement, and which in varying degrees 
animated Louis Brandeis’s and Wright Patman’s views of political economy, 
represented one of the ideological streams that flowed into the postwar con-
sumer movement. Suspicion of bigness, and the related belief that unchecked 
corporate power represented a threat to democracy, continued to exert an 
influence on U.S. politics well beyond the New Deal.
That is not to say, however, that the Depression-era anti-chain store move-
ment was the same as its modern-day counterpart. In fact the differences 
between them are both important and instructive. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
it was clear that small retailers themselves led the movement. While they 
succeeded in attracting considerable support from other quarters, it was the 
merchants who always formed the core of the movement. Organized labor, for 
instance, did take an interest in the anti-chain furor but its interventions were 
selective, based not on aversion to large-scale organizations but on a desire to 
improve the wages and conditions of unionized workers. Accordingly, once 
the American Federation of Labor unions had agreed to collective-bargaining 
terms with A&P in 1938 and 1939, the unions, conscious that their mem-
bers were consumers as much as they were producers, backed the low-price 
chains against their small-town foes. Labor’s response to the chains during 
the late New Deal shows how intimately were the politics of consumption 
and production entwined.40 
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The balance of power between organized labor and independent shopkeep-
ers is quite different today. While it is true that small retailers, joined by an 
assortment of community activists, have been a persistent thorn in the side 
of big-box retailers at the local level over the last twenty years or so, it is the 
unions, led by the United Food and Commercial Workers, that have since the 
turn of the twenty-first century been the most forceful and effective opponents 
of the big chains. The hostility of the current legal and political regime toward 
organized labor, combined with Wal-Mart’s transformative role in the world 
economy, make the stakes of the unions’ present struggles just as high as they 
were for country merchants who feared for the livelihoods during the Great 
Depression. They also lend it a global dimension that was not a feature of the 
older anti-chain store movement.41
Today’s independent merchants have very limited political leverage. They 
no longer have access to the symbolic or rhetorical resources on which their 
Depression-era predecessors could call. This is the case even when they are 
aided by engaged local residents, whether they be eager to preserve the char-
acter of their neighborhoods, to consume ethically, to keep traffic and other 
forms of pollution off their streets, or to protect the prices of their homes. 
If they are to make progress in their present campaigns, small-town retailers 
need to find more effective ways of converting consumers’ unease about the 
size and power of corporate giants such as Wal-Mart into a decisive form of 
political action.
Despite these differences between the two movements, twenty-first century 
anti-chain activists are in the process of rediscovering the anti-chain protesters 
of the 1920s and 1930s. Al Norman, the author of two anti-Wal-Mart tracts 
and founder of Sprawlbusters, a Web site that tracks anti-chain activity, has 
used his site to tell his followers about their Depression-era forebears. John 
Dicker has argued that A&P was to the anti-chain forces in the first half of the 
twentieth century what Wal-Mart is to campaigners in the twenty-first. Most 
arrestingly, perhaps, Stacy Mitchell of the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 
has suggested that state-level anti-chain store taxes of the sort championed 
by Brandeis and Patman be revived as an instrument of public policy. These 
campaigners realize that their arguments—that corporate retail is inimical to 
community life, that it is ugly, and that it exploits workers while driving small 
businesses into the ground—are not new. On the surface at least, they are 
strikingly similar to those put by Kansas City businessman Charles H. Lyon, 
in the letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt with which this study opened.42
Historians seeking a usable past have, in contrast, been harsh in their as-
sessment of anti-chain protesters past and present, portraying their critiques of 
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the chains as insubstantial and self-serving. Meg Jacobs, for example, believes 
that anti-Wal-Mart protesters are “self-interested,” motivated primarily by “aes-
thetic disdain” and by what is implied to be a spurious “claim” that corporate 
retailers wreck a “sense” of community. Lizabeth Cohen praises Christopher 
Lasch and Michael Sandel for their contributions to debates about America’s 
politics of consumption but describes as unrealistic their calls for a renewed 
emphasis on civic as opposed to consumer values. “Such an alternative hope-
lessly resides,” she writes, “in an unregainable past.”43
She may well be right. But nostalgia for a golden age can seduce scholars 
from across the entire political spectrum. Jacobs and Cohen, for example, both 
conclude their hard-headed accounts of the relationships between citizenship, 
consumerism, and the state in the twentieth century with elegiac calls for 
a return to values rooted in the past. Both recommend that the politics of 
consumption the New Deal made be revived. Jacobs insists that the model 
of economic citizenship that emerged from the New Deal represents the best 
hope for reconstructing the “democratic potential of an engaged citizenry 
pursuing the promise of a better, richer life.” Cohen proposes “encourag[ing] 
the revival of the citizen consumer ideal that prevailed during the Great De-
pression and World War II, with its commitment to building into the agen-
cies of government a power base for consumers to assert their will.” How this 
could be done in the present political climate is not made clear. It is debatable 
whether Jacobs’s and Cohen’s New Deal revivalism is any less romantic than 
the idealized civic republicanism of Lasch and Sandel.44
Given the nature of these debates, there is a danger that the historiography 
of consumption, in the United States at least, might deteriorate into an exercise 
in competitive nostalgia, with various factions accusing the other of idealizing 
the past. What emerges from this study of the history and historiography of 
the anti-chain store movement, however, is that the boundaries between New 
Deal liberalism and civic republicanism are distinctly blurred. The populist 
antimonopolism that informed anti-chain politics and helped shape postwar 
consumer politics was not alien to the New Deal. Antimonopolists such as 
Brandeis and Patman helped make the New Deal (even if they did not ap-
preciate the form it eventually took), just as Nader helped fashion the liberal 
readjustment of the 1960s and 1970s. What this suggests is that any usable 
legacy for a more progressive politics of consumption needs to take into ac-
count the heterogeneity of the United States’ politics of reform, and therefore 
of the important place within those politics of an antimonopoly tradition 
that cherished small-scale economies and localism. This in turn reminds us 
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that it was the energy created by competing, and often fiercely conflicting, 
reformist agendas that made the New Deal such a dynamic and enduring 
force in U.S. history. It also suggests that our efforts to grapple effectively 
with the politics of consumption in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
have only just begun.
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